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Abstract
I use data from StockTwits and Twitter to provide evidence that investor attention on social
media in the period before earnings is related to short-term overvaluation, consistent with bullish
investors herding around common information. In the 2 to 60 days after earnings, returns for
companies in the highest quintile of pre-earnings announcement investor attention are 4.2
percent lower than those of companies in the lowest quintile. I find evidence that the negative
post-earnings drift result found in this study is related to investors waiting until after earnings are
announced to enact costly arbitrage strategies. I further examine intra- and inter-network herding
and find evidence that social media influences investors beyond the population of active users.
This study contributes to prior literature on herding, social media, and speculation and arbitrage.
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1 Introduction
This study examines the association between investor attention on StockTwits and
Twitter in the period preceding earnings announcements and negative equity market returns in
the period after earnings are announced. This is important because social media has changed the
way that investors access and process information, lowering the costs of information acquisition
but exposing investors to information with questionable accuracy or focus. Investor attention on
social media, as opposed to investor attention on search engines or investor attention as proxied
by volume, is inherently collaborative because users can interact and view one another’s posts
(Bartov et al. 2018). Prior literature has found that there is online, public information that can
partially preempt earnings (Bagnoli et al. 1999, Bartov et al. 2018). I contribute to this literature
by providing evidence consistent with attention-constrained investors using social media to
research and identify stocks to buy, which results in increasing short-term overvaluations as
more investors pay attention and act on a common set of information.
The internet has changed the financial information ecosystem and reduced information
and investing frictions for retail investors. Starting with message boards and more recently
continuing with social media, the internet has made it easier for investors to work together to
process information. Ideally, these connectivity platforms help improve the information available
to and understanding of information among investors, especially retail investors. My results
suggest, however, that investor attention on social media as proxied by number of active
StockTwits users in the pre-earnings-announcement period (-10 to -2 days relative to earnings) is
related to temporary overvaluation. These results are consistent with prior literature on herding
through social learning (Fudenberg and Kreps 1995) and imitation (Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani
et al. 1992, Shiller 1995, Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003).
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While this study does incorporate a set of posts from Twitter, the main focus is on data
from StockTwits, a financial social media platform. StockTwits, per their Google search headline
“Share Ideas & Learn from Passionate Investors & Traders” is based on the premise that users
will influence each other.1 StockTwits is like other social media sites, such as Twitter or
Facebook, in that users are able to directly communicate with each other opening the possibility
of users influencing collective opinions. Due to this collaborative environment, active
participation on StockTwits can be contrasted to other internet-based proxies for attention like
Google search volume where investors are not necessarily provided with and influenced by
insights from other investors. I find evidence that could be interpreted as active users’ posts
influence investors that are not actively participating as well.
I use social media data to examine investor attention and sentiment in the period before
earnings. Consistent with the results in Bartov et al. (2018), I find that the average sentiment
from the group of users discussing stocks in the period before earnings is positively associated
with earnings period returns, whereas investor attention, defined as the number of active users in
the pre-earnings period, is negatively associated with both the earnings period returns and postearnings period returns, This indicates the crowd on social media is often discussing relevant
earnings information, but that attention is related to investor herding around stale information
and overshooting expectations, causing short-term overvaluation. I also test for and find evidence
that overconfidence (Oskamp 1965, Khaneman and Tversky 1974) related to the number of
different topics covered in posts in the pre-earnings-announcement period dominates the
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In conversations with StockTwits users at their annual meeting, Stocktoberfest, many told me that they learned
how to trade and are making money with knowledge they gained from the website, consistent with the StockTwits
website title: “StockTwits © - Share Ideas & Learn from Passionate Investors & Traders.”
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association between social media attention and overvaluation, indicating the influence of social
media goes beyond users that are actively participating.
As noted in Barber and Odean (2007):
How can we measure the extent to which a stock grabs investors’ attention? A
direct measure would be to go back in time and, each day, question the hundreds
of thousands of investors in our datasets as to which stocks they thought about
that day. Since we cannot measure the daily attention paid to stocks directly, we
do so indirectly (p. 787).2
Prior literature has relied on proxies such as trading volume, media attention and extreme returns
to proxy for events that capture investors’ attention. These proxies, however, are indirect
measures of investor attention. Abnormal trading volume is indicative of the final decision made
by investors but does not consider investors that paid attention but did not act. Media attention
does not consider how investors react to news. Extreme returns may be the result of attention as
well as material information. I argue that investor attention on social media is a more direct
measure of investor attention because it 1) identifies investors’ response to news, and 2) includes
investors that pay attention but don’t trade. This is important because it allows for measurement
of the information qualities that lead to short-term speculative overvaluation. I do not find
evidence that when the sentiment of the crowd is negative there is undervaluation and attribute
this to short-selling constraints.
I expect that StockTwits caters primarily to retail investors who focus on picking stocks
to buy rather than short sell. This could be in part due to the increased costs for short-selling
(D’Avolio 2002). Consistent with overvaluation due to a segment of investors using social media
to research stocks to buy, I find that post-earnings (pre-earnings) period returns are significantly

See also Klibanoff et al. (1998): “The underlying problem facing financial economists is that neither fundamentals
nor other possible determinants of investor behavior, such as ‘investor sentiment,’ are observable.”
2
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negatively (positively) associated with investor attention when sentiment is positive but are not
associated with investor attention when sentiment is negative. I support this by providing cross
sectional evidence that the attention-overvaluation association is only significant when both
traditional media and social media sentiment are positive, consistent with investors being
influenced by a bullish feedback loop. In other cross-sectional tests, I find that the association
between overvaluation and investor attention in the pre-earnings-announcement period is more
pronounced in samples with lower institutional ownership, which provides evidence that that
arbitragers postpone their strategies when limited by short-selling constraints.
Returns in the 60-day period after earnings announcements are negatively associated with
investor attention, regardless of earnings surprise. Miller (1977) explains this anomaly with a
model in which price is a function of collective opinion. In pre-earnings announcement periods
where information is correct but possibly stale or noisy, price formation is delayed as bearish,
short-selling constrained investors are kept out of the market. In this model, based on the
equilibrium point where supply meets demand, price increases as the bullish group of investors
herds around stale information and causes price to overshoot its fundamental value. Chen et al.
(2001) and Kelly and Tetlock (2013) provide expanded theoretical models for the discussion in
Miller (1977).
I make three main contributions with this study. First, I add to the literature on herding by
examining the market impact of investor attention to publicly viewable information. The ease
with which information can be disseminated on social media (Blankespoor et al. 2014) makes it
an ideal platform for low-cost information acquisition by investors. This low-cost barrier makes
it an especially viable source of information for less sophisticated investors who may have
knowledge limitations and cost barriers not shared by their institutional counterparts. In Figure 1,
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I find that the relationship between attention on social media and negative post-earnings return
drift is near-monotonic across quintiles of investor attention.
Second, I elaborate on the results in Bartov et al. (2018) which finds that sentiment on
social media is predictive of earnings surprise and returns. This finding shows that valuable
information is being shared on social media, which makes is it an ideal platform for information
acquisition. StockTwits feeds at the time of this writing are incorporated in platforms including:
Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, Interactive Brokers, Fidelity, Charles Schwab, Trading
Technologies, and eSignal. Social media has been shown in the literature and demonstrated by its
use in trading platforms to be a viable source of financial information. However, it seems the
market is not efficiently incorporating the level of attention given to stocks, as evidenced by the
negative post-earnings drift found in this paper. This should be of interest to investors and
regulators, since as SEC Chairman Jay Clayton said: “serving and protecting Main Street
investors is my main priority at the SEC” (SEC 2018).
Third, I contribute to the literature on speculative trading and arbitrage. Brunnermier and
Abreu (2002, 2003) develop a model in which investors do not know when mispricing will be
corrected. Short-horizon investors predict not only fundamentals, but also the behavior of other
investors. Social media offers an ideal setting to test this. With the assumption that a segment of
the investing population is short-selling constrained by fees, search problems or offsetting capital
(D’Avolio 2002) investors using social media to research stocks to buy in advance of earnings, in
line with Miller (1977), cause a temporary price increase. When earnings are announced, these
investors are no longer focused on earnings, which allows price to return to fundamentals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the
literature and hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 details
5

the data used and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and I conclude in
Section 6.
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.1 StockTwits as a Financial Information Aggregator
Hayek (1945) gave one of the first economics-based arguments for decentralized
aggregation of information. At the time, economists were involved in conversations about
whether a centralized economy or a distributed economy was the most efficient. Hayek argues
that decentralized decisions are better able to incorporate idiosyncratic information. Hayek
(1945) is supported by studies that investigate countries that split up after World War 2. For
example, the unsuccessful centralized economy in East Germany versus the more successful
decentralized economy in West Germany. Social media extends this concept and can be
contrasted with centralized or traditional media. Today, social media posts are often featured in
traditional media stories and media outlets and media articles are often disseminated on social
media. Media decentralization has gotten to a point where it is difficult to distinguish traditional
media from social media.
StockTwits has become a valuable source of information about stocks as it allows for an
efficient method of aggregating information about stocks from a heterogeneous group of users.
The founders of StockTwits invented cashtags, a way for investors to qualify words as tickers by
prepending a dollar sign to the ticker. This seemingly simple idea allows for the efficient
aggregation of company-specific information and therefore more efficient communication
among investors. The cashtag is now a widely-accepted way to qualify ticker symbols and is
used on StockTwits as well as Twitter, with Twitter adopting a few years after the success on
StockTwits. Finding company information about Agilent using ticker symbol “A” is extremely
6

noisy. It is computationally difficult to discern the much more common article “a” from the
ticker for Agilent. However, searching for “$A” on Google will lead to StockTwits and other
results about Agilent.
The posts on social media leverage the power of decentralization and aggregation.
Investors can go to social media to see what people are saying and to get an idea about current
news. The commentaries on social media about current news help add color for investors without
access to insiders, staff or private trading platforms.
2.2 Herding and Independence
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), in their review of information cascades and herding, give a
thorough development of the behavioral components that lead to correlated actions among
individuals. They define herding as a convergence in behavior and cascading as ignoring private
information. They include direct communication and observational influence as possible sources
of herding. Cascading can be thought of as a unit autoregressive process where each action is
determined only by the last action. For example, if a group of investors only used the trade at
time t-1 as the basis the next trade at time t0 then each subsequent action would be the same for
all t. Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et. al. (1992) propose cascading as the mechanism
responsible for causing herding. Shiller (1995) applies these concepts to a social setting in which
herding is based on convergence to group norms through social interaction, as would possibly
occur on social media.
Models of herding have a commonality in that they all rely on a lack of independence
between individuals in a group. On StockTwits as more investors share information and have
discussions in the pre-earnings period, these investors are potentially exerting increasing
influence on one another through their social interactions. StockTwits is often a top result in
7

search engines3 and is used in many trading platforms, so even investors that are not active on
StockTwits are also potentially exposed to the information from these social interactions. I
assume that investor attention on StockTwits is correlated with the overall level of market
attention, and investor attention on StockTwits is likely to influence less sophisticated investors,
who would be more likely to ignore their private information as in models of herding. When
these investors are focusing on stocks to buy and there are market-wide arbitrage constraints, this
would lead to overvaluation as new bullish investors enter the equities market and bearish
investors are kept out of the market.
Curtis et al. (2016) find evidence that contemporaneous earnings-period investor
attention is related to more rapid price discovery around earnings announcements, which is
consistent social media aiding the alignment investors’ opinions. I find that social media
sentiment in the pre-earnings period is positively associated with earnings-period returns, which
provides evidence that social media users are providing actionable information. However, as
more investors acquire information from social media and contribute to social media, there is
potentially a self-reinforcing feedback mechanism in which investors act on bullish sentiment,
price subsequently increases, speculators are validated, and the security gets more attention in
the short-term only to decrease in price after the earnings event. In addition to online
interactions, StockTwits users interact in physical social situations. Figure 1 presents the
StockTwits meetups in North America. This figure shows that 13,437 people where potentially
meeting up in 2017 to discuss how to make money in the stock market. These face-to-face
meetings may further degrade the independence between users.

3

StockTwits is a top result for about 2/3 of the sample used in this study and in the sample of all tickers in 2014 and
2015 available on CRSP.
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2.3 Social Media and the Wisdom of Crowds
Bartov et al. (2018) examine opinion formation on social media using constructs from the
wisdom of crowds. The genesis of the term wisdom of crowds can be traced to Dr. Francis
Galton’s 1907 study titled “Vox Populi” in which individuals’ guesses about the weight of a
dressed ox at a local fair were used as data to provide empirical evidence on the wisdom of
crowds. He found that when the guesses of individuals were averaged, the collective guess was
near perfect. This finding is congruent with the Central Limit Theorem which states that when a
group of observations is independent and identically distributed, the observations converge to a
normal distribution as the number of observations increases. In the case of peoples’ guesses,
ideally, this distribution would be around the actual value. The difference between the setting at
the fair and the setting on social media is that social media users use the platform explicitly for
communication whereas the attendees at the fair did not have information about one another’s
guesses.
The Wisdom of Crowds by James Surowiecki (2004) gives 4 necessary conditions for
wise crowds: diversity of opinion, independence, decentralization, and aggregation.4 Surowiecki
(2004) offers several instances when crowds are not wise because they violate some element of
the wisdom of crowds. In the case of social media there is diversity of opinion, decentralization
and aggregation, but users can influence each other and those that view their public interactions
and thereby potentially violate the independence condition. In a setting with investors focused on
picking stocks to buy, this would lead to overvaluation as investors herd around information

4

Surowiecki (2004) has 566 citations from papers that are indexed on Google scholar and include the terms
“earnings” or “accounting.”
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indicating bullish outcomes. Following Miller (1977), overpricing increases as bullish investors
establish new positions in a stock while bearish investors are kept out of the market.
2.4 Speculative Trading and Arbitrage
Brunnermier and Abreu (2002, 2003) provide theoretical models in which investors face
a synchronization risk when arbitraging mispricing. If arbitrageurs act immediately they incur
holding costs that can make their strategy prohibitive. So, instead they try to time their strategies
so as to minimize holding costs. When a sufficient number of arbitrageurs synchronize their
timing, price begins to return to fundamental value. An alternate explanation for the results in
this paper is that post-earnings liquidity trading causes price to return to fundamental value
(Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990). In Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) transaction costs make
it prohibitive for arbitrageurs to act on their knowledge of mispricing and price slowly drifts
toward the fundamental price after earnings are announced.
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) find evidence that retail investors in Finland are net
buyers of momentum stocks with weak future performance and that institutional investors are net
buyers of momentum stocks with strong future performance. In contrast, Boehmer et al. (2016)
find that stocks with the highest positive (negative) order imbalance5 in the prior week have the
highest positive (negative) abnormal returns in the next 20 days. Lawrence et al. (2018) find
evidence of a causal link between advertisements on Yahoo! and contemporaneous positive
abnormal returns when companies beat analyst earnings expectations. This study complements
Lawrence et al (2018) by providing evidence that investor attention in speculative periods leads

5

Defined as dollar value of shares bought less the dollar value of shares sold scaled by the average daily trading
volume over the prior year.
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to overvaluation. Short selling constraints offer a reason for why there is an association between
attention and overvaluation and not undervaluation.
Regulation T provides that brokers that lend shares to short sellers must have a “bona
fide” cash deposit to offset the lent shares. Firms that lend shares also charge interest on the
shares further increasing the short selling premium. Short selling agreements can vary among
brokers, but they generally include a fee discount for the cash collateral. The interest rates in the
proprietary set used in Reed (2002) range from the special rate of 7.6 percent to the regular rate
of 5.8 percent. D’Avolio (2002), also using a proprietary dataset, shows that the special rate can
be as high as 79 percent. Almazan et al. (2004) note that “73.3 percent of the 679 funds that filed
Form N-SAR in 1994 reported that their investment policies formally restricted them from
selling short” (p. 9). These significant frictions offer a plausible explanation for why investors
herding around bullish social media information can be difficult to arbitrage.
In addition to extra costs, there can be search problems for investors that want to sell
short. Prior literature has found that the search costs for finding a lender decrease with the level
of institutional ownership (Almazan et al. 2004, D’Avolio 2002). D’Avolio (2002) finds that the
special rate increases with attention on Yahoo! Message Boards. As barriers to arbitrage
increase, I expect that mispricing will be more sensitive to investor attention on social media.
Models of short selling constraints in prior literature assume prices are a weighted
average of beliefs (supply and demand) from a heterogeneous set of investors (Miller 1977).
Shares sold short are borrowed, in effect increasing the supply of shares in the market and
theoretically shifting the intersection between supply and demand to the right, lowering price.
Short sales constraints inflate prices by forcing bearish investors out of the market (Lintner 1969,

11

Miller 1977, Figlewski 1981, Jarrow 1981). The short-term overpricing effects of short sales
constraints increase as the level of disagreement between bullish and bearish investors increases.
I draw upon the models of short-selling constrained investors in Chen et al. (2001) and
Kelly and Tetlock (2013), which build on models in Miller (1977). The simple theoretical model
in Kelly and Tetlock (2013) examines the investing population using three sets of investors: A)
investors that are 100 percent rational without short-selling constraints that always pay attention,
B) investors that are less than 100 percent rational without short-selling constraints that always
pay attention, C) investors that are less than 100 percent rational with short-selling constraints
that are not 100 percent attentive. The market clearing price (or price at which the demand from
investors in {A, B, C} equals supply) includes a mispricing term that is proportional to sentiment
and attention. The mispricing term in Kelly and Tetlock (2013) is a function of sentiment,
attention, short-selling constraints, disagreement and risk tolerance. When there are short-selling
constraints, overpricing increases with sentiment and attention. This leads to my hypothesis,
stated in the alternative:
H1: Investor attention on social media in the pre-earnings-announcement period is positively
related to overvaluation.
3 Empirical Design
I start the empirical design section with a description of the textual analysis methods
incorporated in this study. Textual analysis, while not directly applicable to the main variable of
interest, investor attention on social media, is a component of the experimental design and thus
necessary to explain for later exposition of the models employed.

12

3.1 Sentiment Measurement
I use a supervised machine learning method known as the Paragraph Vector method
(Mikolov and Le, 2014) to classify the level of bullishness of unclassified posts in the
StockTwits and Twitter datasets used in this study. This method utilizes a neural network that
incorporates the position of words used in documents. This is in contrast to bag of words
methods that assume independence between words. The Paragraph Vector method is ideal for
StockTwits data because of the approximately 8 million user-classified posts in the dataset that
facilitate supervised learning. In untabulated results, I find that Paragraph Vector-based
classification is more accurate than Naïve Bayes classification. The Paragraph Vector
classification used in this paper is 64% accurate in the full set of posts. The Naïve Bayes
classification using the same training data is 55% accurate. Both methods are more accurate with
smaller datasets. Training with millions of user-classified records introduces noise to the extent
that users say the same thing with different explicit opinion qualifiers. For example, if User A
posts “I am excited about $A earnings” (user-classified as bullish) and User B posts “I am
excited about $A earnings” (user-classified as bearish), these posts introduce noise in the
classification model.
To quantify user sentiment, each unclassified post is given a value that indicates the
probability of the post being either positive (bullish) or negative (bearish). If a post is userclassified as bullish, it is given a sentiment value of 1. If a post is user-classified as bearish, it is
given a sentiment value of -1. The paragraph vectors from the set of user-classified bullish and
bearish posts are used to calculate the parameters of a logistic regression model. I use these
parameters with the Paragraph Vectors of unclassified posts to calculate the probabilities of
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unclassified posts being either bullish or bearish. I use the average sentiment from each user in
the pre-earnings period. SM Sent is the sum of these averages and is calculated as follows:

𝑆𝑀 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 =

1
∑ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖
#𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑖

Where i is the index for each post from a given user. SM Sent is the by-user average sentiment in
the pre-announcement period t.
3.2 Using LDA to Measure User-Generated Information
Shiller (2017) uses the term “narrative economics” to describe how narratives influence
economies and provides a discussion of how people think in terms of narratives. Thorsrud (2018)
uses Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) learned topics as a proxy for narratives in news stories
and shows that LDA topics and sentiment in media articles can be used to predict economic
fluctuations. I use LDA to classify the topics that social media users are discussing around
earnings. This unsupervised learning algorithm uncovers latent topics using the underlying
frequencies of the words used in documents. Although the label of the topics used in this study
does not influence the results, I manually add labels to the topics to help make the divisions more
salient. The topics include technical, earnings speculation, past earnings info, attention to news,
recommendations, SEC filings and earnings news.
LDA assumes documents are combinations of topics and topics are based on word
frequency distributions. The LDA algorithm uses sampling based on known priors (word
frequencies and number of topics) to train model parameters that maximize the tradeoff between
the precision of document topic distributions and precision of topic word frequency distributions.
Chang et al. (2009) finds that LDA classifies topics as a person would.
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I train the LDA model used in this study on the set of all posts in the -10 to -2 days
relative to earnings announcements so as to best capture topics discussed in the period before
earnings. Prior to training the model, I convert all cashtags from their specific form to a generic
form (e.g. $A to $cashtag), convert all mentions (e.g. @bob to @mention), convert all links (e.g.
http://www.yahoo.com to |link), convert numbers (e.g. 123 to #number) and lemmatize all words
(e.g. stopping to stop). I train the model with the cleaned set of posts. I then use the trained
model to derive the most representative topic for each post. For each quarterly announcement I
construct a variable Ln(#Topics) which equals the natural log of the number of topics discussed
in the pre-earnings period.
I vary the number of topics between 20 and 80 and find similar results with these
variations. I use 40 topic categories in this study. Topics with written-in names are provided in
Appendix B. The categories include words that indicate topics including: current news, past
news, user speculation, technical charts, and earnings news.
In line with prior literature that has provided evidence that retail investors are more likely to buy
rather than short a stock (for example, Barber and Odean 2007), and with literature on
information and overconfidence. Oskamp (1965) was one of the first studies to show that people
become more confident as the amount of information they use in a decision increases, even if
new information is not material. In his experimental study, subjects were given information
about a case study. As the subjects were given more (but not relevant) info, their confidence
about being correct rose from 33 to 53% while their accuracy remained consistently below 30%.
They describe a similar study on the “representativeness” bias: confidence in new, but worthless
information without regard to prior probabilities. Subjects in the representativeness study were
told that 2/3 of a population were engineers and 1/3 lawyers. When the subjects were given
15

additional but worthless information their guesses were around 50%, whereas without that
additional information, the subjects’ guesses were closer to the prior probabilities.
3.3 Empirical Models

3.3.1 Main Model
The main research question concerns whether there is an association between attention on
social media and short-term overvaluation. I therefore begin the empirical analysis with an
examination of the association between the number of active users in the pre-earningsannouncement period (-10 to -2 days relative to the earnings announcement) and abnormal
returns. I examine the attention-returns association in three timespans: -10 to -2 days relative to
earnings, -1 to 1 days around earnings, and 2 to 60 days6 after earnings are announced. The preearnings timespan captures the contemporaneous association between social media attention and
returns. The earnings period timespan captures the preemptive nature of the association between
attention and returns. The post earnings timespan is of interest for answering the main research
question, whether social media attention leads to short-term overvaluation. This model assumes
that price adjusts to the arrival of fundamental information in the earnings period, but does not
completely resolve overvaluation from the shift in the investing population. If the overvaluation
were resolved in the earnings period then there should be no drift in the post earnings period. I
used the following model, Model 1 to test for an association between overvaluation and
attention:
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑘

6

I follow Bernard and Thomas (1989), which finds that most drift occurs in the 60 days after earnings are
announced, I examine abnormal returns in the 2 to 60 days after earnings are announced to identify return reversals.
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AR are the market-adjusted abnormal returns in period t relative to the quarterly earnings
announcement i for firm j. The main variable of interest in this model is 𝐿𝑜𝑔(#𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠)−10,−2. I
expect that β1 will be positive in the period before earnings are announced and negative in the
period after earnings are announced, consistent with short-term overvaluation and subsequent
reversal. I test H1 in the period after earnings are announced, when investors are no longer have
incentive to speculate on earnings.
I support the association between investors using social media and the search for stocks
to buy and overvaluation with an examination of investor attention and order imbalance. I use 2
different measures of order imbalance: 1) overall order imbalance with buys and sells classified
using the algorithm in Chakrabarty et al. (2007), and 2) retail order imbalance as classified by the
algorithm in Boehmer et al. (2017). The Chakrabarty et al. (2007) algorithm extends the Lee and
Ready (1993) algorithm to better account for trades that occur inside the bid and ask quotes,
which controls for misclassification of stocks that are shorted. Boehmer et al. (2017) relies on
retail orders being filled through a wholesale market which can be uncovered with fraction of
cent trades on the FINRA Trade Reporting Facility. I examine the association between investor
attention and buying stocks using Model 2, shown below:
𝑂𝐼𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑘

OIMB is the order imbalance in period i relative to the quarterly earnings announcement at time t
for firm j. I expect that β1 will be positive in the period before earnings are announced for retail
order imbalance. In support of H1, I expect that β1 will be positive for overall and retail order
imbalance in the period before earnings. I expect that overall order imbalance will be negative in
the period after earnings are announced.
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I examine the association between social media attention and synchronization risk for
investors that do not currently own the overvalued stocks using short selling data from the
NASADQ PSX exchange. Because there are many additional costs such as having offsetting
capital, margin payments when price fluctuates, and opportunity costs (D’Avolio 2002), it is
beneficial for short sellers to wait until after earnings are announced to sell short. I use Model 3,
described below, to test this:
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑘

Where Short Interest is the number of shared sold short scaled by shares outstanding in period i
relative to the quarterly earnings announcement at time t for firm j. If arbitrageurs are timing
their strategies, I expect that the coefficient on β1 will be more negative in the period after
earnings are announced.

3.3.2 Intra- or Inter-Network Herding?
If social media users are herding around information that is pushed to their accounts, then
I expect that attention from users with the most visibility (proxied for by their number of
followers) will have a larger negative association with post-earnings returns than the total level
of social media attention. However, since StockTwits is often a first-page Google search result
and is incorporated in several trading platforms, I might not find evidence of within-network
herding. For each year in the StockTwits dataset, I rank StockTwits users by their number of
followers (people that subscribe to their posts) and label the top 1000 users. I use this set of top
users to measure the effects of intra-network herding. Model 4 is shown below:

18

𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑳𝒏(#𝑻𝒐𝒑 𝑭𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑘

AR are the market-adjusted abnormal returns in period i relative to the quarterly earnings
announcement at time t for firm j. If only investors within the StockTwits platform are buying,
then I expect the coefficient from the users with the most followers, 𝛽2 , will be greater than the
coefficient on 𝛽1in the post-earnings period.
If instead, investors that don’t participate, but use the information on StockTwits, are
driving the short-term overvaluation then I expect that these users will be more likely to buy a
stock based on the number of topics covered in the posts that they browse, consistent with prior
behavioral findings in Oskamp (1965) and Khaneman and Tversky (1974). I use Model 5, shown
below to examine inter-network herding resulting from overconfidence:
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑳𝒏(#𝑻𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒄𝒔)−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑘

If investors that come across StockTwits (this includes investors that are members of StockTwits
as well as investors that incorporate StockTwits chatter in their decisions) are convinced to buy
because of a greater number of topics, then I expect that 𝛽2 will be negative and significant in the
post-earnings period. If investors outside of the active StockTwits community become
overconfident as a result of the information shared on the site, then 𝛽2 will be less than 𝛽1 in the
post-earnings period.
3.4 Control Variables
I add controls for firm characteristics and sources of public information other than social
media. I add Market Cap, the natural logarithm of the number of shares outstanding multiplied
by the share price at the end of the fiscal quarter to control for lower information content in the
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earnings news for larger firms (Ataise 1985). I add Ln(#Analysts), the natural logarithm of the
analyst following in the I/B/E/S Summary database, to control for the demand for information
from sophisticated investors (Bhushan 1989).7 I add Market to Book, calculated using Compustat
quarterly market and book values, to control for value or earnings yield (Penman et al. 1996, Ball
et al. 2017). I add Institutional% to control for the level of investor sophistication (Potter 1992)
and short-selling constraints (Miller 1977). I add a Q4 indicator variable to control for
information differences in the 4th fiscal quarter (Das and Shroff 2002). I add standardized
unexpected earnings (SUE) to control for the impact of new information about cash flows.
I add additional controls for media attention and sentiment, StockTwits sentiment, and
attention to the SEC’s EDGAR website. I proxy for media attention with the natural log of the
number of news article observations in the RavenPack database (Ln(#News Stories)). For each
observation in the RavenPack database, I center the RavenPack Composite Sentiment Score
(CSS) around zero and rescale the range to [-1, 1]. I take the average of the scaled sentiment in
all news stories to proxy for the news sentiment (News Sent). I include SM Sent to control for the
average sentiment of users on StockTwits. Finally, I include Ln(Retail EDGAR IP) to control for
investors’ demand for fundamental information. I calculate Ln(Retail EDGAR IP) using the
EDGAR IP logs and according to the algorithm in Drake et al. (2015).
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data sources and variables are listed in Appendix A. Social media data are from
StockTwits and Twitter. StockTwits data were granted by StockTwits management. StockTwits

7

The firms used in this study have at least on analyst following them during the given firm-quarter. In untabulated
tests, social media activity from firms with no analyst following has a weaker (not statistically significant)
correlation with equity market returns.
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data consists of the complete set of posts in the years 2014 and 2015. In addition to the post
itself, each record includes, among other things, attributes of the user, the time of the post, user
sentiment, and cashtags used. StockTwits has no limitation on stocks that can be discussed, so
the final sample consists of all companies that have active users participating in the -10 to -2
days relative to earnings that can be merged with the other data in the study. StockTwits posts at
the time of this writing are incorporated in Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, Interactive Brokers,
Fidelity, Charles Schwab, Trading Technologies, eSignal, and other online trading platforms. An
example post is provided in Figure 5. StockTwits is a private company the earns revenue from
advertising and events.
Twitter data were collected using the streaming API in the period from August to
December 2015. This dataset includes 99.9% of the posts for which a cashtag in the Standard and
Poor’s 1500 was used. A very small portion of tweets were lost due to rate limiting by the
Twitter API.
I use CRSP to calculate abnormal returns and market capitalization. I obtain analyst
following for each firm from the I/B/E/S summary database. I calculate the percentage holdings
by institutional investors using the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings database, which is
derived from the 13-F filings of institutional investors. I use the Trades and Quotes (TAQ)
millisecond intraday data to construct the measures of order imbalance used in this study. I use
Compustat to construct the measure of market to book. I use RavenPack8 to construct measures
of news attention and sentiment. Finally, I use EDGAR IP Log files to construct measures of
attention to fundamental information.

“RavenPack analyzes unstructured content from thousands of publications to extract information on named entities
and financially relevant events in the public eye” (http://www.whartonwrds.com/datasets/ravenpack/).
8
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Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the main results. The average abnormal
returns in the -10 to -2 days relative to earnings (the pre-earnings-announcement period) as well
as in the 2 to 60 days after earnings are slightly negative. The main results in this study are
robust to the inclusion of firm-fixed effects. The mean earnings period returns are near zero. The
median quarterly earnings announcement had 5 unique active StockTwits users in the preearnings-announcement period. The median of 5 users is similar to the median seen in Table 7 of
Bartov et al. (2018). The median quarterly earnings announcement had 72 retail EDGAR IP
accesses and 164 different news observations in RavenPack. The median market to book ratio in
the sample is 2.574, which is consistent with social media users following glamor stocks. The
median analyst following is 9. The maximum institutional ownership in the sample is greater
than 1, which Lewellen (2009) attributes to 13F data only including long positions (that is, shares
held and lent out for short-selling are included). The portion of the sample with over 100 percent
institutional ownership is also consistent with Lewellen (2009). The mean standardized
unexpected earnings (SUE) is positive. The Q4 indicator is 1 about 25 percent of the time,
consistent with a near-balanced panel of quarterly announcements.
Table 2 presents the Fama-French 48 industry classifications for the sample used to
construct the main results. Business Services has the most of observations relative to other
categories. Business Services has more subcategories than many of the other Fama-French
classification and encompasses computers and technology. Blankespoor et al. (2014) limit their
sample to technology firms because these firms have better representation on social media. This
is consistent with my sample. Agriculture has the fewest observations, also consistent with social
media users being more likely to be interested in technology-like firms.
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5 Results
5.1 Simulation and Actual
Panel A of Figure 2 presents the results of a simulation based on the theoretical shortselling constrained equilibrium price in Kelly and Tetlock (2013) and Panel B presents the actual
market-adjusted abnormal returns contemporaneous with quintiles of StockTwits sentiment and
attention. The comparison between the two panels assumes that the stocks in Panel B were at
their fundamental price at the beginning of the pre-earnings-announcement period and no new
fundamental information has been released in the pre-earnings period. With this assumption, the
contemporaneous abnormal returns associated with investor attention and sentiment on
StockTwits align with the simulation of the model of misvaluation in Kelly and Tetlock (2013).
5.2 Main Results
The central research question in this study relates to whether attention on social media in
the period before earnings is associated with overvaluation. Stated formally, is attention on social
media in the speculative period before earnings associated with short-term overvaluation?
Obviously, each post is from someone conveying information that may be or may not be
relevant, but it is an empirical question whether or not the number of users participating is
related to attention to stale information. In Figure 3, I provide compelling evidence that attention
on social media is related to short-term overvaluation. I use 3-Factor plus momentum-adjusted
returns in graphs to control for firm characteristics that are covary with other firms and cause
noise. When separated by quintile of attention on StockTwits, I find that post-earnings drift is
monotonically decreasing in the 3 quintiles with the most attention, with an abnormal returns of 4.2 %, -1.8% and -0.5%. The 2 quintiles with the last attention have near-zero post-earnings
drift.
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Table 3 presents the results of Model 1. In Model 1, the dependent variable is marketadjusted abnormal returns. The table is divided into three periods: the pre-earnings period (-10 to
-2 days before earnings), the earnings period (-1 to 1 days around earnings), and the postearnings period (2 to 60 days after earnings). The results show that StockTwits Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is
positively related to returns in the period before earnings (coefficient=0.004, t-statistic=3.24) are
announced. This finding is consistent with short-selling constrained investors’ stock purchasing
actions being associated with social media activity. The coefficient on Ln(#Users)-10,-2 during the
earnings period is negative and significant in the earnings period (coefficient=-0.002, t-statistic=2.02), consistent with prior literature that finds there is online information that preempts earnings
news (Bagnoli et al. 1999, Bartov et al. 2018). The coefficient on Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is also
negative and significant in the post-earnings period (coefficient=-0.01, t-statistic=-4.69),
providing additional support for H1.
Among the noteworthy controls in Table 3, in the post-earnings period the coefficients on
each of the other proxies for attention are insignificant. Ln(#News Stories)-10,-2 controls for the
cumulative news coverage and is negative in the pre-earnings-announcement period as well as
during the earnings period and is not significant in the period after earnings are announced.
Ln(#News Stories)-10,-2 does not capture the investors’ reaction to news stories. I also include a
control for the number of retail views (by IP address) of EDGAR information to proxy for
investor attention to fundamental information. This proxy does capture interest from fundamental
investors, however, the coefficient in the post-earnings period is insignificant. Other investors do
not see the interpretations of EDGAR views and therefore this null result for the coefficient on
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP)-10,-2 is expected to be zero.
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Both the average sentiment from news outlets as well as the average sentiment from
StockTwits users in the pre-earnings announcement period is positively related to earnings
period abnormal returns. The finding that news sentiment in 2014 and 2015 is related to earnings
period returns is in contrast to findings in Bartov et al. (2018) which does not find this
relationship in 2009-2012. This speaks to the increasing overlap in content between traditional
and social media.
In Table 4, I use Twitter posts from the Standard and Poor’s 1500 in the period from
August 2015 and December 2015 to show that the relationship between attention and
overvaluation is consistent across social media platforms. The dependent variable is marketadjusted abnormal returns in both models. The coefficient on Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is similar in
magnitude in both models, -0.007 on StockTwits and -0.008 on Twitter. The Ln(#Users)-10,-2
coefficient is more significant in the model using Twitter data, which could be attributed to
Twitter having better coverage of the investing population. This intuitively makes sense as
Twitter has a much larger user base than StockTwits and therefore is a less noisy approximation
of the aggregate level of investor attention. The results also indicate that Twitter sentiment is a
better predictor of earnings period returns. The coefficient on Twitter sentiment is 0.108 with a tstatistic of 3.31 whereas the coefficient on StockTwits sentiment is 0.024 with a t-statistic of
0.72. These results suggest that social media attention in general before earnings is related to
overvaluation, even when controlling for contemporaneous pre-earnings returns.
In Table 5, I present the results of Model 2. I use two measures of order imbalance as my
dependent variables: retail order imbalance and overall order imbalance. Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is
positively related to retail order imbalance in both the pre-earnings-announcement period
(coefficient=0.021, t-statistic=9.60) and the post-earnings-announcement period
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(coefficient=0.020, t-statistic=9.66). However, Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is only significantly related to
overall order imbalance in the pre-earnings-announcement period. This finding is consistent with
social media attention capturing the contemporaneous exuberance of the market, but also with
the findings in Lee (1992) in which retail investors are likely to buy stocks without considering
earnings surprise because these events draw the attention of retail investors. Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is
not significantly related to overall earnings period or post-earnings period order imbalance. The
lack of a significant relationship suggests that current owners are not arbitraging short-term
overvalued stocks in this sample. Ln(#News Stories)-10,-2 is positively related to retail order
imbalance and negatively related to overall order imbalance in the pre-earnings-announcement
period. This is consistent with prior literature that finds evidence that institutional investors
provide liquidity to retail investors focusing on glamour stocks (Barber and Odean 2007).
In Table 6, I present the results of Model 3 in which the relationship between short
selling and social media activity around earnings announcements is examined. Abreu and
Brunnermier (2002) provide a model in which arbitrageurs delay until there is lower
synchronization risk. If arbitrageurs wait until after earnings are announced to enact their
strategies, I expect that the relationship between attention on social media and short selling will
be greater after earnings are announced. In Table 9, I use daily short selling data from the
NASDAQ PSX exchange to provide evidence that this is the case. The relationship between
Ln(#Users)-10,-2 and short selling is positive and significant in all periods. Using the Z-statistic to
test for differences between models (Clogg et al. 1995), the coefficient in the period after
earnings is significantly greater than in the period before earnings are announced (p-value =
0.09), providing additional evidence that could be could be construed as arbitrageurs delaying
their strategies until after earnings are announced. These results suggest that synchronization risk
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is part of the reason for the negative post-earnings drift associated with social media attention.
That is, the current owners of the stocks do not seem to be selling after earnings are announced,
but a population of arbitrageurs that don’t currently own the stocks in this study appear to be
waiting until after earnings to sell short.
Table 7 presents cross-sectional results based on quintile sorts. The dependent variable in
all models is abnormal returns in the 2 to 60 days relative to earnings. In panels with quintile
sorts, quintile 1 encompasses the portion of the sample with the lowest levels of the sort variable
and quintile 5 encompasses the portion of the sample with the highest levels of the sort variable.
Panel A presents results based on sorts of institutional ownership. Institutional ownership has
been used as a proxy for shares available to be sold short (D’Avolio 2002, Asquith et al. 2005).
The coefficient on Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is negative and significant in quintiles 1-3 (coefficients=0.014, -0.011, -0.013 for quintiles 1, 2, 3) and not significant in quintiles 4 and 5 (coefficients=0.003,-0.001 for quintiles 4, 5), which have the greatest institutional ownership. These results
provide evidence consistent with synchronization risk when the resolution of short-term
overvaluation is delayed when it is more costly.
I examine disagreement as proxied by analyst EPS forecast dispersion in Panel B and find
evidence that overvaluation increases with uncertainty among analysts, consistent with models
based on Miller (1977) and with Boehme et al. (2006), which finds that overvaluation is related
to the dispersion of opinions among investors. I present the results of sorts based on analyst
following in Panel C and do not find significant variation across these samples. Panel D presents
the results based on sorts by the level of dispersion of opinions from social media users in the -2
to -10 days relative to earnings. Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is negative and significant in quintile 5
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(coefficient=-0.018, t-statistic=-3.03) and insignificant in quintile 1 (coefficient=0.003, tstatistic=0.47). This result is consistent with the analyst dispersion result in Panel B.
In Panel E, I present results of a cross sectional analysis based on media sentiment and
social media sentiment. I find that investor attention in the pre-announcement period is only
related to future negative returns when both media and social media sentiment are positive
(coefficient=-0.013, t-statistic=-4.96). This provides evidence that investors are using multiple
streams of information and are more likely to buy stocks when information in these different
channels is aligned. This finding supports the feedback loop explanation for herding in
Fudenberg and Kreps (1995).
In Table 8, I separate the sample by positive and negative social media sentiment to
examine whether there is a difference between investor attention when sentiment is generally
negative as opposed to when sentiment is generally positive. Consistent with investor attention
being related to picking stocks to buy and social media users influencing each other, I find that
abnormal returns in the post-earnings-announcement period are negatively related to investor
attention when sentiment is positive (coefficient=-0.013, t-statistic=-4.59) and are not related
when sentiment is negative (coefficient=-0.005, t-statistic=--1.57). Sentiment predicts returns
only in the set of announcement in which investors were positive.
I further examine social media attention when sentiment is positive sentiment in Figure 4.
Figure 4.1 provides the full-period (-10 to 60 days around earnings) graph of average 3 factor
plus momentum-adjusted returns for companies that beat analyst expectations for the highest and
lowest quintiles of social media attention. The stocks that had the least attention prior to
earnings, have almost no drift after earnings are announced. The set of stocks that had the highest
levels of social media attention have distinctly negative drift after earnings are announced. The
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high attention set of companies also seems to be preempting earnings, but only to later reverse
even beyond the price increase from the earnings surprise. Figure 4.2 provides the results for
companies that missed analyst expectations. This set of companies also has negative drift after
earnings are announced.
5.3 Intra- or Inter-Network Herding?
In Tables 9 and 10, I present the results of Models 4 and 5 and provide evidence that
passive users9 are contributing to the herding effects seen in this study. In Table 9, I include
attention from the most visible users in the network as well as attention from the all active users.
StockTwits users with the most followers will have their posts viewed by more other users
within the StockTwits network.10 If active StockTwits users are driving this result then I expect
attention from top users have a greater effect on herding since users within the platform are more
likely to see these top users’ posts. In Table 10, I examine the relationship between the number
or topics covered across all posts and overvaluation. If investors that are either active or
passively participating in StockTwits are driving the results in this study then I expect the
number of topics covered will have a greater impact on overvaluation as investors are more
likely to become overconfident in this setting (Khaneman and Tversky 1974).
Table 9 provides the results of Model 4 and provides evidence that the most visible users
on StockTwits are not driving the reversal effect. The coefficient on Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is positive
and significant (coefficient=-0.007, t-statistic=-2.22) whereas the coefficient on Ln(#Top Users)
is not significant (coefficient=0.003, t-statistic=0.68). The top-followed users are the most visible

9

Passive users in this context are not active in the StockTwits community in the period before earnings. StockTwits
is a first-page Google search result for two-thirds of the cashtags used in this study, so it is possible that StockTwits
chatter is being utilized by investors that are not members of the site. StockTwits feeds are also utilized in
Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, Interactive Brokers, Fidelity, Charles Schwab, Trading Technologies, and eSignal.
10
If a user follows another user the follower will see the posts from the followee.
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to users within the network. By design their posts are pushed to the greatest number of other
users. These within-network highly-visible users have the same visibility to investors that come
across StockTwits as part of their information search. This result suggests that intra-network
herding is not driving the result found in this study.
Table 10 presents the results of Model 5 and provides evidence that investors that use
StockTwits (active or passive) are more likely to buy stocks when more topics are covered in the
pre-earnings-announcement period, consistent with investors becoming increasingly
overconfident as more information is presented in the pre-earnings-announcement period. The
number of topics discussed by users in the pre-earnings-announcement period, Ln(#Topics)-10,-2
(coefficient=-0.013, t-statistic=-3.32) dominates Ln(#Users)-10,-2 (coefficient=-0.001, t-statistic=0.39) in the post-earnings period. At the extreme, if all 40 topics are covered, this would lead to a
5 percent negative abnormal return in the period after earnings are announced. This provides
evidence that inter-network herding among the set of investors that utilize social media as an
information source is driving the negative drift associated with social media attention. The
results in Table 9 in combination with the results in Table 10, are consistent with passive
StockTwits users contributing to the overvaluation effect seen in this study. This provides
evidence that herding on social media spills over to investors that don’t actively participate.
5.4 The Chicken or the Egg
So far this study has left as an open question whether social media users are following the
market or whether the market is following social media users. That is, generally speaking, are
social media users discussing events that have already occurred or are they discussing relevant
speculative information? I examine this question using Grainger causality tests for the complete
sample timespan (2014 and 2015) and in a panel of the 60 days after earnings are announced.
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In Table 11, I present the results of this analysis. I find that change in social media
attention in the full timespan Grainger-causes returns (chi-squared=36.461) and returns
Grainger-cause change in social media attention (chi-squared=11.921), indicating a general
cointegrated relationship between social media attention and returns. However, in the panel set
constructed on the 60 days after earnings are announced, I find that returns Grainger-cause
change in social media attention (chi-squared=5.483), but change in social media attention does
not Grainger-cause returns. These results could be interpreted to suggest that StockTwits users
are more focused on speculation than post mortem analysis of earnings information.
6 Conclusion
This study uses data from StockTwits and Twitter to examine whether investor attention
on social media is related to short-term overvaluation in the speculative period before earnings
are announced. I find evidence that social media users (as well as news sources in RavenPack)
are generally correct about upcoming earnings announcements, but that attention on social media
is related to short-term overvaluation, providing evidence that social media users, active or
passive, are paying attention to and acting on stale information. This finding is of interest to
investors, regulators and academics.
This study finds that attention from StockTwits users is related to contemporaneous
overall order imbalance, but not related to overall order imbalance after earnings are announced.
This is consistent with current owners of stocks not selling their overvalued stocks, which
provides evidence that part of the negative drift result found in this study is not attributable to
synchronization risk from current owners. I also find that the relationship between attention from
StockTwits users has a greater relationship with short-selling after earnings are announced,
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indicating that arbitrageurs are timing their strategies. Together these results suggest that the
negative drift found in this study is related arbitrage from short sellers.
This study finds evidence that the influence of social media spills over to users that are
not actively participating in conversations. This is important because it demonstrates that social
media users are influencing investors that they may not be aware of. This spill-over of
discussions to trading platforms or investors that come across social media is an interesting area
for future study that may help add sophistication and understanding to the impacts of this
relatively new information dissemination platform.
This study contributes to literature on heading through social learning, to literature on
social media and to literature on speculation and arbitrage. This study does not intend to imply
that social media should be regulated. There were speculative bubbles long before social media.
For example, the Tulip bubble that collapsed in 1637 (Shiller 2005), over 200 years before the
invention of the telegraph.
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8. Appendices
Appendix A
Variable descriptions
Variable
Abnormal Returns
Order Imbalance (OIMB)

Retail Order Imbalance (Retail
OIMB)

Short Interest

Ln(#Users)-10,-2

Ln(#Top Users)

Ln(#Topics)

Ln(#News Stories)
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP)

Description

Database

The CRSP return (ret) less the value
weighted return (vwretd)
The value of stock bought less the
value of stock sold divided by the total
value of stock bought and sold: (buysell)/(buy+sell). Buys and sells are
classified according to the algorithm
in Chakrabarty et al. (2007)
The value of stock bought by retail
traders less the value of stock sold by
retail traders. Trades classified
according to the algorithm in Boehmer
et al. (2016)
The number of shared sold short
scaled by the number of shares
outstanding
The natural Ln of the number of
unique active users in the -10 to -2
days before earnings are announced
The natural log of the number of users
in the set of 1000 users with the most
followers in a given year
The entropy of the topics that
StockTwits users discuss in a given
time period.
The natural Ln of the number of news
stories
The natural Ln of the number of
EDGAR IP accesses from retail users
using the algorithm from Drake et al.
(2015)

CRSP
TAQ

TAQ

StockTwits

StockTwits

StockTwits

RavenPack
EDGAR IP Logs
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Appendix A (Cont.)
Variable

Description

Database

Ln(#Analysts)

The natural log of the number of
analysts following a firm during the
given quarter
The shares outstanding multiplied by
stock price the day before earnings
are announced
The shares outstanding multiplied by
share price at the end of the quarter,
all divided by the book value of
equity
Percentage of holdings from
institutional investors

I/B/E/S Summary

Market Cap

Market to Book

Institutional%

News Sent
Q4

The average sentiment from news
stories in the given time period
Dummy variable for announcements
in the 4th fiscal quarter

CRSP

Compustat

Thompson Reuters
Institutional
Holdings
RavenPack
I/B/E/S
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Appendix B LDA topic labels and word weight distributions
topic #

Topic
0 recommendations
1 past earnings info
2 speculation
3 attention to news
4 noise glamour
5 sec filing
6 bullish news
7 tech charts
8 predict trends

words and weights
0.094*know + 0.079*make + 0.070*want + 0.057*got + 0.045*better + 0.044*play +
0.034*never + 0.026*level + 0.020*away + 0.018*shorting
0.255*er + 0.152*last + 0.146*time + 0.128*close + 0.060*open + 0.015*qtrs + 0.015*sp +
0.013*am + 0.013*pre + 0.011*fuel
0.124*sell + 0.048*many + 0.043*love + 0.038*give + 0.033*investor + 0.032*real + 0.027*set
+ 0.027*every + 0.023*value + 0.021*tell
0.235*share + 0.128*|link + 0.031*interesting + 0.026*technoLny + 0.025*per + 0.024*picked +
0.024*director + 0.022*launch + 0.021*done + 0.021*corporation
0.044*gap + 0.039*bbry + 0.035*always + 0.033*business + 0.031*made + 0.029*minute +
0.028*pay + 0.026*-- + 0.026*more + 0.025*twitter
0.239*new + 0.074*change + 0.049*sec + 0.049*form + 0.048*file + 0.038*reports +
0.036*filing + 0.035*events + 0.035*check + 0.033*passport
0.083*bullish + 0.058*hour + 0.051*morning + 0.040*growth + 0.027*following + 0.026*article
+ 0.023*early + 0.018*name + 0.015*fda + 0.014*talking
0.119*|link + 0.083*chart + 0.041*support + 0.034*q3 + 0.031*bounce + 0.031*show +
0.029*daily + 0.029*resistance + 0.026*bearish + 0.024*line
0.160*go + 0.086*u + 0.056*up + 0.048*run + 0.045*higher + 0.039*sale + 0.035*:) + 0.032*ah
+ 0.026*ready + 0.024*lets

positive
9 buying stock
10 earnings
expectations

0.050*point + 0.040*order + 0.024*finally + 0.024*trader + 0.022*baby + 0.022*remember +
0.021*mm + 0.020*talk + 0.020*off + 0.017*adding
0.123*beat + 0.058*guidance + 0.054*miss + 0.041*squeeze + 0.036*the + 0.025*expectation +
0.015*will + 0.015*hot + 0.014*so + 0.014*q1
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Appendix B (Cont.)
topic # Topic
11 upcoming earnings

words and weights

0.328*earnings + 0.137*|link + 0.076*analyst + 0.074*release + 0.064*expect + 0.051*eps +
0.036*thursday + 0.025*wednesday + 0.017*tuesday + 0.017*anybody
12 attention
0.255*like + 0.169*look + 0.039*v + 0.031*trying + 0.020*find + 0.020*margin + 0.012*+003 +
0.012*broke + 0.012*agreement + 0.010*panic
13 noise
0.053*add + 0.045*: + 0.045*nq + 0.038*me + 0.022*ebola + 0.019*part + 0.018*car + 0.015*wtf
+ 0.014*andy + 0.013*ford
14 short sell
0.166*short + 0.049*lol + 0.045*right + 0.041*now + 0.040*way + 0.039*money + 0.029*getting
+ 0.027*bear + 0.024*around + 0.022*lower
15 bad news
0.090*news + 0.048*bad + 0.040*plug + 0.034*down + 0.033*action + 0.032*this + 0.029*thats
+ 0.026*nothing + 0.025*mean + 0.025*guess
16 questions about low 0.091*week + 0.085*next + 0.071*volume + 0.060*looking + 0.054*low + 0.041*anyone +
0.040*strong + 0.017*idea + 0.016*ago + 0.016*pretty
17 estimize
0.078*w + 0.071*symbol + 0.069*top + 0.061*estimize + 0.046*game + 0.039*tomorrow +
0.026*open + 0.019*covered + 0.015*ipad + 0.015*network
18 buy and hold
0.047*good + 0.039*see + 0.038*get + 0.037*going + 0.035*long + 0.031*market + 0.029*back +
0.028*one + 0.028*think + 0.024*would
19 rating
0.351*|link + 0.036*rating + 0.032*target + 0.030*blackberry + 0.030*pt + 0.019*corp +
0.016*capital + 0.013*bank + 0.012*security + 0.011*partner
20 cashtag
0.606*$cashtag + 0.256*#number + 0.018*call + 0.011*&amp; + 0.009*put + 0.009*move +
0.007*option + 0.006*bought + 0.006*sold + 0.005*may
21 earnings news
0.113*|link + 0.095*quarter + 0.072*result + 0.051*announces + 0.043*financial + 0.039*first +
0.039*conference + 0.026*report + 0.024*bb + 0.022*must
22 insider trade
0.145*|link + 0.073*inc + 0.059*tonight + 0.056*million + 0.047*filed + 0.029*group +
0.025*update + 0.022*insider + 0.021*event + 0.020*ltd
23 technical
0.071*third + 0.035*upside + 0.028*surprise + 0.027*took + 0.024*wonder + 0.022*based +
0.021*later + 0.020*record + 0.019*offer + 0.018*load

41

Appendix B (Cont.)
topic # Topic
24 technical positive
25 earnings
speculation
26 going long
27 earnings
expectations
28 market conditions
29 advertising
30 my trade
31 analyst ratings2
32 discussion
33 stock pop
34 apple
35 earnings report

words and weights
0.296*- + 0.118*|link + 0.097*nice + 0.027*breakout + 0.025*second + 0.022*major + 0.020*due
+ 0.017*setup + 0.015*closing + 0.013*running
0.064*= + 0.058*little + 0.049*ahead + 0.041*reason + 0.027*bit + 0.027*popular + 0.025*pain +
0.023*case + 0.021*q4 + 0.021*max
0.069*holding + 0.061*it + 0.055*take + 0.049*well + 0.044*profit + 0.037*green + 0.034*huge
+ 0.031*bull + 0.027*gonna + 0.024*red
0.193*price + 0.132*tomorrow + 0.079*announcement + 0.076*movement + 0.071*last +
0.069*qrtrs + 0.061*reporting + 0.037*friday + 0.033*|link + 0.013*po
0.250*stock + 0.075*since + 0.063*drop + 0.050*trading + 0.049*continue + 0.049*er +
0.045*positive + 0.037*aftr + 0.030*past + 0.027*pm
0.059*great + 0.056*buying + 0.053*even + 0.042*selling + 0.036*monday + 0.027*in +
0.026*imo + 0.024*yet + 0.023*doesnt + 0.022*bottom
0.108*trade + 0.095*position + 0.059*number + 0.048*added + 0.025*investment + 0.025*recent
+ 0.024*retail + 0.022*date + 0.021*cap + 0.019*opening
0.124*eps + 0.097*estimate + 0.083*|link + 0.080*consensus + 0.080*rev + 0.073*report +
0.068*compared + 0.055*wall + 0.048*published + 0.047*estimize
0.412*@mention + 0.180*buy + 0.022*also + 0.020*bell + 0.016*thanks + 0.015*street +
0.012*too + 0.010*folk + 0.010*nasdaq + 0.009*told
0.089*keep + 0.075*guy + 0.067*pop + 0.032*statement + 0.030*is + 0.030*anything +
0.027*ownership + 0.027*acquisition + 0.021*mkt + 0.020*late
0.063*apple + 0.055*watch + 0.037*ceo + 0.036*|link + 0.024*work + 0.022*product +
0.020*system + 0.020*co + 0.017*billion + 0.016*store
0.338*today + 0.085*revenue + 0.065*q314 + 0.041*potential + 0.030*block + 0.028*full +
0.020*est + 0.016*report: + 0.014*llc + 0.014*signal
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Appendix B (Cont.)
topic # Topic
36 announcement
37 momentum
38 trading results
39 technical news

words and weights
0.117*high + 0.062*quarterly + 0.044*cash + 0.043*dividend + 0.031*hard + 0.029*interest +
0.027*close + 0.026*range + 0.026*dec + 0.024*management
0.038*energy + 0.037*deal + 0.028*mobile + 0.025*head + 0.025*help + 0.024*plan + 0.018*cost
+ 0.018*key + 0.017*momentum + 0.017*global
0.176*day + 0.051*another + 0.048*break + 0.037*hit + 0.036*stop + 0.036*month + 0.034*end +
0.031*again + 0.024*loss + 0.023*gain
0.066*| + 0.057*tickerchirp + 0.049*tweet + 0.034*trend + 0.032*average + 0.027*risk +
0.026*via + 0.025*possible + 0.024*current + 0.023*read

43

9. Tables
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
variable
N
mean variance
p10
p50
p90
p99
AR-10,-2
12,265 -0.004
0.005
-0.069 -0.004 0.060 0.201
AR-1,1
12,265 0.000
0.016
-0.095 0.000 0.094 0.245
AR2,60
12,265 -0.014
0.034
-0.215 -0.011 0.156 0.566
Ln(#Users)-10,-2
12,265 1.946
1.298
0.693 1.609 3.401 5.908
Ln(#News Stories) -10,2
12,265 5.270
1.456
4.025 5.130 6.739 8.968
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP) -10,2 12,265 2.965
7.283
0.000 4.277 6.011 7.547
SM Sent-10,2
12,265 0.012
0.018
-0.144 0.000 0.189 0.394
News Sent-10,2
12,265 0.016
0.000
-0.006 0.016 0.036 0.058
SUE
12,265 0.0002 0.0001 -0.005 0.0004 0.0056 0.0387
Market Cap
12,265 21.305
3.148
19.106 21.206 23.698 25.813
Ln(#Analysts)
12,265 2.151
0.498
1.099 2.197 3.091 3.497
Market to Book
12,265 4.036
42.848
0.986 2.574 8.642 46.364
Institutional %
12,265 0.622
0.052
0.306 0.661 0.850 1.007
Q4
12,265 0.2485 0.1868
0
0
1
1
This table provides the descriptive statistics for the main results in this study.
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Table 2 Fama-French 48 Industry Classification
Industry Classification
Count Industry Classification
Count
Agriculture
15 Machinery
327
Aircraft
71 Measuring and Control Equipment
190
Almost Nothing
51 Medical Equipment
320
Apparel
74 Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining
53
Automobiles and Trucks
240 Personal Services
135
Banking
844 Petroleum and Natural Gas
558
Beer & Liquor
32 Pharmaceutical Products
761
Business Services
1,488 Precious Metals
31
Business Supplies
135 Printing and Publishing
74
Candy & Soda
39 Real Estate
56
Chemicals
283 Recreation
85
Coal
23 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels
231
Communication
261 Retail
289
Computers
294 Rubber and Plastic Products
75
Construction
162 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment
37
Construction Materials
139 Shipping Containers
28
Consumer Goods
135 Steel Works Etc.
139
Defense
16 Textiles
25
Electrical Equipment
124 Tobacco Products
36
Electronic Equipment
637 Trading
438
Entertainment
128 Transportation
310
Fabricated Products
21 Utilities
447
Food Products
134 Wholesale
311
Healthcare
205 *No SIC or not in Fama-French 48
1,297
Insurance
461 Total
12,265
This table presents the distribution of the sample for the main results by Fama-French 48
industry classification.
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Table 3 Social media attention and overvaluation
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑘

AR-10,-2
-0.125***
(-10.01)
0.004***
(3.24)
-0.002***
(-3.40)
-0.000
(-0.86)
0.036***
(6.32)
0.334***
(8.10)

AR-1,1
AR2,60
***
Constant
-0.109
-0.207***
(-4.81)
(-6.94)
**
Ln(#Users)-10,2
-0.002
-0.010***
(-2.02)
(-4.69)
***
Ln(#News Stories) -10,2
-0.002
0.001
(-2.65)
(0.83)
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP) -10,2
-0.001**
0.000
(-2.32)
(0.17)
SM Sent-10,2
0.026***
0.024
(3.63)
(1.64)
News Sent-10,2
0.220***
0.076
(4.65)
(0.78)
AR-10,-2
-0.059***
-0.084**
(-3.62)
(-2.39)
SUE
1.802***
0.130
(10.77)
(0.47)
Market Cap
0.006***
0.007***
0.011***
(8.73)
(5.52)
(6.40)
Ln(#Analysts)
-0.010***
-0.009***
-0.014***
(-7.20)
(-5.03)
(-3.58)
**
Market to Book
-0.000
-0.000
0.000
(-0.93)
(-2.40)
(0.37)
Institutional %
0.009***
-0.002
0.004
(2.86)
(-0.47)
(0.47)
Q4
0.013***
0.006***
-0.003
(9.14)
(3.04)
(-0.78)
Observations
12,265
12,265
12,265
Adjusted R2
0.034
0.034
0.008
Firm SE cluster
yes
yes
yes
This table presents of the results to test hypothesis H1. Models are run with clustered standard
errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively
(using two-tailed tests). The t-statistic is shown in parenthesis.
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Table 4 Twitter vs. StockTwits (S&P 1500)
Constant
Ln(#StockTwits Users)-10,-2

AR2,60
-0.184***
(-3.07)
-0.008*
(-1.87)

Ln(#Twitter Users) -10,-2
Ln(#News Stories) -10,-2
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP) -10,-2
StockTwits Sent-10,-2

0.001
(0.15)
0.000
(0.36)
0.024
(0.72)

AR2,60
-0.224***
(-3.45)
-0.007***
(-2.59)
0.001
(0.29)
0.000
(0.27)

0.108***
(3.31)
News Sent-10,-2
0.070
0.062
(0.35)
(0.31)
AR-10,-2
-0.120
-0.117
(-1.41)
(-1.39)
***
Market Cap
0.011
0.013***
(3.24)
(3.51)
***
Ln(#Analysts)
-0.026
-0.026***
(-3.31)
(-3.38)
Market to Book
0.000
0.000
(0.61)
(0.47)
Institutional %
0.002
0.002
(0.13)
(0.13)
Q4
-0.007
-0.006
(-0.48)
(-0.42)
Observations
2,962
2,962
2
Adjusted R
0.005
0.010
Firm SE cluster
yes
yes
This table uses 45 million posts of Twitter data collected between August 2015 and December
2015. This set includes 99.9% of the posts from Twitter users that mentioned the cashtag of a
company in the S&P 1500. Models are run with clustered standard errors. *, **, *** indicate
significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests). The tstatistic is shown in parenthesis.
Twitter Sent-10,-2
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Table 5 Social media attention and order imbalance
𝑂𝐼𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑘

Constant
Ln(#Users)-10,2
Ln(#News Stories) -10,2
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP) -10,2
SM Sent-10,2
News Sent-10,2

Retail
OIMB-10,-2
0.016
(0.40)
0.021***
(9.60)
0.008**
(2.44)
0.002*
(1.69)
0.053***
(2.97)
-0.012
(-0.10)

Overall
OIMB-10,-2
-0.094***
(-8.38)
0.002***
(2.94)
-0.002**
(-2.33)
-0.000
(-0.66)
0.014***
(2.67)
0.018
(0.49)

-0.010***
(-4.19)
0.005
(0.94)
0.001
(1.57)
-0.084***
(-5.97)
0.005
(1.04)
10,821
0.031
yes

0.004***
(6.01)
0.000
(0.35)
0.000
(0.32)
0.018***
(5.26)
0.000
(0.23)
10,821
0.017
yes

SUE
Market Cap
Ln(#Analysts)
Market to Book
Institutional %
Q4
Observations
Adjusted R2
Firm SE cluster

Retail
OIMB-1,1
0.057
(1.25)
0.017***
(7.02)
0.008**
(2.36)
0.002
(1.54)
0.042**
(2.06)
-0.038
(-0.25)
0.250
(1.13)
-0.011***
(-4.03)
0.007
(1.05)
0.000
(0.48)
-0.085***
(-5.68)
0.008
(1.38)
10,821
0.019
yes

Overall
OIMB-1,1
-0.023
(-1.28)
0.001
(0.98)
0.001
(0.95)
-0.000
(-0.71)
0.003
(0.36)
-0.225***
(-3.65)
-0.202
(-1.49)
-0.000
(-0.25)
0.004**
(2.09)
0.000***
(2.86)
0.029***
(5.14)
-0.001
(-0.51)
10,821
0.009
yes

Retail
OIMB2,60
-0.073*
(-1.91)
0.020***
(9.66)
0.005*
(1.77)
0.002*
(1.66)
0.048***
(3.00)
0.004
(0.04)
-0.025
(-0.19)
-0.005**
(-2.06)
0.001
(0.27)
0.001
(1.32)
-0.111***
(-7.81)
0.006
(1.53)
10,821
0.043
yes

Overall
OIMB2,60
-0.097***
(-9.29)
-0.000
(-0.05)
-0.000
(-0.67)
-0.000*
(-1.70)
0.009*
(1.90)
0.002
(0.07)
0.077
(1.12)
0.003***
(5.84)
0.003***
(2.65)
0.000**
(2.02)
0.021***
(6.50)
0.002
(1.44)
10,821
0.037
yes

This table shows the relationship between order imbalance in the -10 to -2 days, -1 to 1 days, and 2 to 60 days relative to the earnings
announcement for a given firm and attention on social media. Retail order imbalance is calculated using the algorithm in Boehmer et
al. (2017). Overall order imbalance is calculated using the algorithm in Chakrabarty et al. (2007). Models are run with clustered
standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests). The tstatistic is shown in parenthesis.
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Table 6 User Attention and Short-selling
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] + 𝜷𝟐 𝑳𝒏(#𝑻𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒄𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐]
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑘

Short-10,-2

Short-1,1

Short2,60

0.098***
1.523***
(11.15)
(9.91)
Log(#Users)-10,2
0.007***
0.092***
(4.68)
(5.82)
Log(#News Stories-10,-2)
0.000
0.006
(0.60)
(1.22)
Log(#Retail EDGAR IP)-10,-2
0.000
0.001
(0.72)
(0.30)
SM Sent-10,-2
-0.003
0.031
(-1.00)
(0.91)
News Sent-10,-2
-0.051*
-0.477
(-1.90)
(-1.42)
AR-10,-2
0.017
0.114
(1.34)
(1.00)
SUE
0.066
-0.170
(1.09)
(-0.11)
Market Cap
-0.010***
-0.006***
-0.081***
(-11.15)
(-10.25)
(-9.02)
Log(#Analysts)
0.009**
0.008***
0.099***
(2.11)
(5.96)
(5.39)
Market to Book
-0.001**
-0.000***
-0.003***
(-2.27)
(-2.77)
(-3.15)
Institutional %
-0.010**
-0.003
-0.106***
(-2.01)
(-1.27)
(-3.09)
q4
0.002
0.000
0.004
(0.69)
(0.55)
(0.60)
Observations
12,008
12,008
12,008
Adjusted R2
0.109
0.148
0.130
Firm SE Cluster
yes
yes
yes
The dependent variables in this table are market-adjusted abnormal returns in the -10 to -2 days,
-1 to 1 days, and 2 to 60 days relative to the earnings announcement. Ln(#Topics) is the entropy
of the topics discussed on StockTwits in the -10 to -2 days relative to earnings. Models are run
with clustered standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01
levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests). The t-statistic is shown in parenthesis.
Constant

0.191***
(12.60)
0.019***
(3.45)
-0.000
(-0.10)
-0.000
(-0.02)
-0.005
(-0.64)
-0.047
(-0.57)
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Table 7 Cross-sectional analysis
Panel A: Institutional Ownership
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗,[2,60] = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑘

Q1
-0.193***
(-2.98)
-0.014***
(-3.28)
2,453
0.011
yes
yes

Constant
Log(#Users)-10,2
Observations
Adjusted R2
Controls
Firm SE cluster

Panel B: Analyst dispersion
Q1
Constant
-0.007
(-0.11)
Log(#Users)-10,2
-0.004
(-0.96)
Observations
2,453
2
Adjusted R
0.004
Controls
yes
Firm SE cluster
yes

Q2
-0.138*
(-1.73)
-0.011**
(-2.27)
2,453
0.016
yes
yes

Q3
-0.112
(-1.11)
-0.013***
(-2.91)
2,453
0.007
yes
yes

Q4
-0.138
(-1.01)
-0.003
(-0.72)
2,453
0.004
yes
yes

Q5
-0.034
(-0.35)
-0.001
(-0.26)
2,453
0.001
yes
yes

Q2
-0.151**
(-2.28)
-0.005
(-1.09)
2,453
0.002
yes
yes

Q3
-0.185***
(-2.79)
-0.005
(-1.10)
2,453
0.006
yes
yes

Q4
-0.284***
(-4.06)
-0.010**
(-2.25)
2,453
0.012
yes
yes

Q5
-0.358***
(-4.83)
-0.018***
(-3.26)
2,453
0.019
yes
yes

Q2
-0.008
(-0.08)
-0.011**
(-2.01)
2,453
0.009
yes
yes

Q3
-0.178**
(-2.14)
-0.010**
(-2.35)
2,453
0.003
yes
yes

Q4
-0.281***
(-3.42)
-0.006
(-1.58)
2,453
0.010
yes
yes

Q5
-0.366***
(-4.34)
-0.013***
(-3.76)
2,453
0.054
yes
yes

Panel C: Analyst following
Constant
Log(#Users)-10,2
Observations
Adjusted R2
Controls
Firm SE cluster

Q1
-0.090
(-0.99)
-0.010*
(-1.76)
2,453
0.003
yes
yes
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Table 7 (Cont.)
Panel D: Social media disagreement
Q1
Constant
-0.049
(-0.71)
Log(#Users)-10,2
0.003
(0.47)
Observations
2,453
2
Adjusted R
0.005
Controls
yes
Firm SE cluster
yes

Q2
-0.274***
(-4.12)
-0.007*
(-1.71)
2,453
0.011
yes
yes

Q3
-0.180***
(-2.90)
-0.013***
(-3.31)
2,453
0.008
yes
yes

Q4
-0.205***
(-2.80)
-0.009*
(-1.94)
2,453
0.004
yes
yes

Q5
-0.280***
(-4.36)
-0.018***
(-3.03)
2,453
0.015
yes
yes

Panel E: Social media and media sentiment
SM+,MSM-,M+
SM+,M+
SM-,MConstant
-0.285
-0.212***
-0.190***
-0.168
(-1.58)
(-5.14)
(-4.20)
(-1.59)
Log(#Users)-10,2
-0.012
-0.005
-0.013***
-0.004
(-1.09)
(-1.56)
(-4.96)
(-0.49)
Observations
817
5,071
5,317
1,038
Adjusted R2
0.019
0.009
0.011
0.009
Controls
yes
yes
yes
yes
Firm SE cluster
yes
yes
yes
yes
This table presents the cross-sectional regression results that focus on limits to arbitrage,
attention from analysts and size (all quintiles are sorted from low to high). Panel A shows the
results based on quintile of institutional ownership. Panel B shows the results based on quintile
of analyst dispersion. Panel C shows the results based on quintile of analyst following. Panel D
shows the results based on quintile of social media disagreement. Panel E is divided by the
sentiment on social media and the sentiment in the news. SM+ indicates positive sentiment on
social media, M+ indicates positive sentiment in media articles. The sentiment divisions are
made on sentiment in the -10 to -2 days relative to each quarterly earnings announcement in the
sample. Models are run with clustered standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p <
0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests). The t-statistic is shown
in parenthesis.
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Table 8 Buying bulls
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑘

AR-10,-2
Constant
Ln(#Users)-10,-2
Ln (#News Stories) -10,2
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP) -10,2
SM Sent-10,2
News Sent-10,2

AR2,60

Pos SM Sent
-0.117***
(-6.30)
0.006***
(4.21)
-0.003***
(-3.29)
-0.000
(-1.09)
0.027**
(2.43)
0.306***
(5.08)

Neg SM Sent
-0.139***
(-7.86)
-0.000
(-0.03)
-0.001
(-1.62)
0.000
(0.10)
0.032**
(2.28)
0.340***
(6.29)

0.006***
(5.54)
-0.008***
(-4.16)
-0.000
(-1.61)
0.010**
(2.12)
0.016***

0.007***
(7.13)
-0.011***
(-5.44)
0.000
(0.49)
0.010**
(2.18)
0.010***

AR-10,-2
SUE
Market Cap
Log(#Analysts)
Market to Book
Institutional %
Q4

Pos SM Sent
-0.214***
(-4.75)
-0.013***
(-4.59)
0.002
(0.74)
0.001
(0.79)
0.060**
(1.97)
0.021
(0.14)
-0.068
(-1.35)
0.109
(0.28)
0.011***
(4.32)
-0.013**
(-2.21)
-0.000
(-0.52)
-0.004
(-0.37)
-0.018***

Neg SM Sent
-0.210***
(-5.22)
-0.005
(-1.57)
0.001
(0.37)
-0.001
(-0.82)
0.003
(0.10)
0.157
(1.34)
-0.097*
(-1.95)
0.108
(0.29)
0.010***
(4.72)
-0.015***
(-3.09)
0.001*
(1.82)
0.014
(1.15)
0.013***
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Table 8 (Cont.)
(7.00)
(5.98)
(-3.19)
(2.82)
Observations
6,144
6,121
6,144
6,121
Adjusted R2
0.031
0.036
0.009
0.008
Firm SE cluster
yes
yes
yes
yes
The dependent variables in this table are market-adjusted abnormal returns in the -10 to -2 days, -1 to 1 days, and 2 to 60 days relative
to the earnings announcement. The sample is divided by average sentiment on social media. Models are run with clustered standard
errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests). The t-statistic is
shown in parenthesis.
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Table 9 Within-network dissemination and herding
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] + 𝜷𝟐 𝑳𝒏(#𝑻𝒐𝒑 𝑭𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐]
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑘

AR-10,-2
-0.096***
(-5.67)
0.008***
(4.88)
0.001
(0.56)
-0.003***
(-3.38)
-0.000
(-1.22)
0.037***
(4.31)
0.376***
(6.35)

AR-1,1
AR2,60
**
Constant
-0.092
-0.191***
(-2.02)
(-4.75)
Ln(#Top Followed Users)-10,2
0.004
0.003
(1.09)
(0.68)
Ln(#Users)-10,2
-0.005**
-0.007**
(-2.27)
(-2.22)
Ln(#News Stories) -10,2
-0.002
0.001
(-1.53)
(0.28)
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP) -10,2
-0.001
0.000
(-1.40)
(0.28)
SM Sent-10,2
0.030**
0.007
(2.51)
(0.35)
News Sent-10,2
0.225***
0.094
(3.43)
(0.74)
AR-10,-2
-0.057**
-0.133***
(-2.45)
(-2.90)
SUE
1.985***
0.063
(5.72)
(0.15)
Market Cap
0.005***
0.006***
0.010***
(5.07)
(2.68)
(4.63)
***
***
Ln(#Analysts)
-0.009
-0.010
-0.019***
(-4.74)
(-4.00)
(-3.52)
**
Market to Book
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
(-1.23)
(-2.42)
(-0.06)
Institutional %
0.011**
-0.002
0.014
(2.45)
(-0.22)
(1.05)
Q4
0.012***
0.011***
-0.009*
(6.32)
(3.33)
(-1.87)
Observations
6,514
6,514
6,514
Adjusted R2
0.041
0.022
0.008
Firm SE cluster
yes
yes
yes
The dependent variables in this table are market-adjusted abnormal returns in the -10 to -2 days,
-1 to 1 days, and 2 to 60 days relative to the earnings announcement. Ln(#Top Followed Users)10,-2 is the natural log of the number of unique active users in the set of the 1000 top-followed
users by year in the -10 to -2 days relative to earnings. Models are run with clustered standard
errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively
(using two-tailed tests). The t-statistic is shown in parenthesis.
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Table 10 User-generated information and overconfidence
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] + 𝜷𝟐 𝑳𝒏(#𝑻𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒄𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐]
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑘

AR-10,-2
-0.125***
(-10.00)
-0.001
(-0.54)
0.004***
(3.10)
-0.002***
(-3.39)
-0.000
(-0.87)
0.036***
(6.33)
0.333***
(8.08)

AR-1,1
AR2,60
***
Constant
-0.109
-0.207***
(-4.81)
(-6.94)
*
Ln(#Topics)
-0.004
-0.013***
(-1.79)
(-3.32)
Ln(#Users)-10,2
0.001
-0.001
(0.44)
(-0.39)
Ln(#News Stories) -10,2
-0.002***
0.002
(-2.63)
(0.93)
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP) -10,2
-0.001**
0.000
(-2.32)
(0.17)
SM Sent-10,2
0.028***
0.029*
(3.89)
(1.93)
News Sent-10,2
0.216***
0.061
(4.56)
(0.62)
AR-10,-2
-0.059***
-0.084**
(-3.63)
(-2.38)
SUE
1.801***
0.110
(10.76)
(0.41)
Market Cap
0.006***
0.007***
0.010***
(8.77)
(5.56)
(6.20)
***
***
Ln(#Analysts)
-0.010
-0.009
-0.013***
(-7.17)
(-4.96)
(-3.42)
**
Market to Book
-0.000
-0.000
0.000
(-0.91)
(-2.29)
(0.51)
Institutional %
0.009***
-0.003
0.003
(2.83)
(-0.56)
(0.32)
Q4
0.013***
0.007***
-0.002
(9.10)
(3.10)
(-0.41)
Observations
12,265
12,265
12,265
Adjusted R2
0.034
0.034
0.008
Firm SE cluster
yes
yes
yes
The dependent variables in this table are market-adjusted abnormal returns in the -10 to -2 days,
-1 to 1 days, and 2 to 60 days relative to the earnings announcement. Ln(#Topics) is the entropy
of the topics discussed on StockTwits in the -10 to -2 days relative to earnings. Models are run
with clustered standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01
levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests). The t-statistic is shown in parenthesis.
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Table 11 Grainger-causality tests

Full Timespan (2014, 2015)
Variable

Grainger Causes

Chi-Squared

ΔLn(#Users)

Return

36.461***

Probability>ChiSquared
0.000

Return

ΔLn(#Users)

11.928***

0.001

2 to 60 Days After Earnings Announcement
Variable

Grainger Causes

Chi-Squared

ΔLn(#Users)

Return

0.114

Probability>ChiSquared
0.736

Return

ΔLn(#Users)

5.483**

0.019
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10. Figures

index
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

place
Las Vegas
New York City
Santa Monica
Colorado
Calgary
West Palm Beach
Philadelphia
Long Island
Raleigh-Durham
Austin
Detroit
Frederick
Fort Worth
Pensacola
Portland
Boston
Cleveland
Irvine

#members
282
1,690
650
449
370
339
394
274
223
352
497
35
272
301
21
693
501
271

index
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
Total

place
Seattle
Baltimore
Dallas
San Diego
Toronto
Fort Meyers
San Francisco
Atlanta
Augusta
Nashville
Chicago
Kansas City
Washington DC
Miami
Cincinnati
Topeka
Phoenix
World

#members
768
371
623
311
734
164
378
330
348
129
477
507
215
177
138
61
92
13,437

Figure 1. StockTwits meetups.
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Figure 2.1. Simulation of mispricing using equilibrium point in Kelly and Tetlock (2013). I use
the equilibrium price for short-short selling constrained investors without disagreement:
(𝛾𝐵 +[𝜃+𝐼(𝑚>0)(1−𝜃)]𝛼𝛾𝐶 )𝑚
𝐹+𝑠𝐼 +𝑘𝑠𝑡
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 =
+
.
2+𝑘
(𝛾 +𝛾 +𝛼𝛾 )/(2+𝑘)
𝐴

𝐵

𝐶

I use 𝛾𝐴 = 10, 𝛾𝐵 = 1, 𝛾𝐶 = 10, 𝜃 = 0.3, and vary sentiment, m and attention, α. The variable γ
is the risk tolerance of each investor group in {A, B, C}. The variable α is the level of attention
from investors in group A. The variable θ represents the percent of the population in the set A
that is not short-selling constrained. I normalize the fundamental price and scale by a factor of
10.

Figure 2.2. Actual sentiment and attention by quintile of sentiment and attention on StockTwits.
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Figure 3. Post-earnings cumulative abnormal return drift by quintile of StockTwits attention
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Figure 4.1. Extreme quintile cumulative abnormal returns for companies that had net positive
sentiment and beat analyst expectations.

Figure 4.2. Extreme quintile cumulative abnormal returns for companies that had net positive
sentiment and missed analyst expectations.
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Figure 5: StockTwits post example.
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